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People’s self-images are grounded in autobiographical memories and, in particular, in the 
phenomenological experience associated with remembering. The desire to increase or 
maintain the positivity of the self-image (i.e., the self-enhancement motive) might thus play 
an important role in shaping memory phenomenology. This study examined this hypothesis 
by asking participants to recall positive and negative events that involve self-evaluations (i.e., 
pride and shame) and positive and negative events that involve evaluations about others (i.e., 
admiration and contempt); various phenomenological characteristics (e.g., sensory details, 
feeling of re-experiencing) were assessed using rating scales. The results show a positivity 
bias (i.e., subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events) 
for events that involve self-evaluations but not for events that involve evaluations of others. In 
addition, this bias was stronger for people high in self-esteem. It is concluded that biases 
affecting the phenomenology of autobiographical memory are part of the arsenal of 
psychological mechanisms people use to maintain a positive self-image. 
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Remembering an event does not consist in “playing” or “reading” a literal record of the past, 
it is a constructive process in which bits and pieces of information from various sources (e.g., 
perceptual, contextual, semantic, emotional details) are re-combined together in order to 
mentally reconstruct the past experience (Conway, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Schacter & Addis, 
2007). As a consequence, memory is prone to various kinds of errors, illusions, and 
distortions (Schacter, 1999). Biases and distortions in the way we remember our personal past 
originate, in part, from self-related motives. In particular, Conway recently proposed that 
memory is strongly influenced by demands of coherence between memories and the self 
(Conway, 2001, 2005; Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). The self and memories have to form 
a coherent system, in which each component informs and constrains the other; what is 
encoded, maintained, and retrieved in priority is information that is consistent with an 
individual’s goals, self-images, and self-beliefs, and reciprocally, beliefs and knowledge 
about oneself are grounded in memories of specific experiences (Conway et al., 2004). In a 
similar vein, McAdams (2001) has argued that identity consists of an internalized and 
evolving story of self that is based on autobiographical memories as well as future 
expectations. McAdams further emphasized that life stories are constructions and that some 
remembered episodes are more privileged for self-definition than are others. Although healthy 
people’s memories are of course not completely disconnected from reality, they tend to be 
altered, distorted, and may even be fabricated to support the self-concept (Conway, 2005; 
Greenwald, 1980; Wilson & Ross, 2003). “To a certain degree, then, identity is a product of 
choice. We choose the events that we consider most important for defining who we are” 
(McAdams, 2001, p. 110). 
Perhaps the most powerful self-related motive is the desire to maintain or increase the 
positivity of one’s self-concept (i.e., the self-enhancement motive; Baumeister, 1998; Leary, 
2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). Various strategies are used to achieve this goal: for 
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example, people tend to take more responsibility for success than failure, to compare 
themselves with others that are worse than they are, and to distance themselves from those 
who outperform them (for reviews, see Baumeister, 1998; Leary, 2007; Sedikides & Gregg, 
2003). Research also suggests that the self-enhancement motive influences what we 
remember about ourselves. First, studies of the self-reference effect (Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1977) show that positive information (e.g., trait adjectives such as “kind”) is better 
recalled than negative information (e.g., trait adjectives such as “dishonest”) when it is 
processed in relation to the self, but not when it is related to another person or when it is 
processed for general meaning (D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van der Linden, 2005; Denny & 
Hunt, 1992; Kuiper & Derry, 1982; Sanz, 1996; Sedikides & Green, 2000; Sedikides & 
Green, 2004). Second, some studies have revealed a series of biases in the functioning of 
autobiographical memory that probably contributes to enhance and maintain positive self-
views. For example, research by Ross and colleagues indicates that self-enhancement goals 
influence people’s subjective judgments of when a past episode occurred (Wilson & Ross, 
2003). They showed, in particular, that people tend to feel farther from past failures than from 
past achievements, even when calendar time does not differ (Ross & Wilson, 2002). Other 
studies demonstrated that the affective intensity of autobiographical memories fades more 
rapidly for negative than for positive events, thus giving people a heightened sense of 
positivity when remembering life events (reviewed in Walker, Skowronski, & Thompson, 
2003). Exploring disputes over memory ownership in twins, Sheen, Kemp, and Rubin (2006) 
observed that twins tend to claim for themselves memories of achievements, and are more 
likely to give away memories of personal wrongdoing. Finally, some studies suggest that the 
content of confabulations is not random, but rather reflects the operation of self-enhancement 
motives (Conway & Tacchi, 1996; Fotopoulou, Conway, Griffiths, Birchall, & Tyrer, 2007; 
Fotopoulou, Conway, & Solms, 2007).  
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A defining feature of autobiographical memory is the phenomenological experience 
associated with remembering. Remembering an event is accompanied by a particular state of 
consciousness that consists of, for example, “seeing” in one’s mind the location where the 
event took place and the persons who were present, feeling the emotions one felt at the time, 
and so forth (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Rubin, Schrauf, & Greenberg, 2003). 
The particular configuration of sensory, contextual, semantic, and emotional features that is 
experienced while remembering an event gives rise to the feeling of mentally re-experiencing 
the past (i.e., recollective experience), which is the hallmark of episodic memory (Conway, 
2005; Tulving, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997). Recollective experience in turn 
influences the perceived or subjective truth of the memory (whether it is actually accurate or 
not is a different issue; Johnson, 2006) and determines the power of the memory in shaping 
self-images. A memory that is experienced as containing highly detailed sensory, contextual, 
and emotional features will provide more information to exemplify, contextualize, and ground 
core beliefs about the self. The desire to maintain or increase the positivity of the self-concept 
should thus exert particularly strong influences on the phenomenological experience 
associated with remembering, leading to the formation of more detailed memories for events 
that convey favourable views of the self. Surprisingly, however, the handful of studies that 
examined the subjective qualities of autobiographical memories for positive versus negative 
events have led to inconsistent results. Some studies found that memories for positive events 
are subjectively experienced with more details than memories for negative events (Byrne, 
Hyman, & Scott, 2001; Bywaters, Andrade, & Turpin, 2004; D'Argembeau, Comblain, & Van 
der Linden, 2003; D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Destun & Kuiper, 1999; Schaefer 
& Philippot, 2005). However, other studies detected very few differences between positive 
and negative events (Bohanek, Fivush, & Walker, 2005; Comblain, D'Argembeau, & Van der 
Linden, 2005) or found that emotional intensity is a better predictor of autobiographical 
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memory experience than emotional valence (Reisberg, Heuer, McLean, & O'Shaughnessy, 
1988; Talarico, LaBar, & Rubin, 2004).  
A possible explanation of these conflicting findings is that the sampled events varied 
in terms of their relevance to the self-image. For example, when asked to remember positive 
and negative events in a previous study, participants recalled events that had direct 
implications for their self-image (e.g., episodes of success or failure at school), but also events 
that were less related to the self-concept (e.g., having fun at a party, being informed of the 
death of a friend; D’Argembeau et al., 2003). Such mixing of self-relevant and non-self-
relevant events might blur valence effects presumably related to the self-enhancement motive. 
Insofar as biases towards subjectively remembering positive events with more details than 
negative events serve the self-enhancement motive, they should be specifically apparent when 
remembering events that have direct implications for the self-image. The primary purpose of 
this study was to test this hypothesis, by investigating the influence of valence on memories 
for events that entail a strong self-evaluative component. From this perspective, self-
conscious emotions such as pride and shame are particularly interesting to examine, as they 
are evoked by positive or negative evaluations about the self (Leary, 2007; Tangney, 2003). In 
this study, these two self-conscious emotions were compared to positive and negative 
emotions arising from evaluations targeting another person (i.e., admiration and contempt). 
Our hypothesis is that the valence (positive vs. negative) and target (self vs. other) of 
evaluations should interact to influence the phenomenological characteristics of memories, 
such that a positivity bias should be apparent for events that involve evaluations of the self but 
not for events that involve evaluations of someone else.  
The second purpose of this study was to explore whether biases in autobiographical 
memory are modulated by individual differences in the positivity of the self-image. If 
autobiographical memory biases are indeed related to the self-enhancement motive, they 
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should be stronger for people who succeed in maintaining a positive view of the self, such as 
people high in self-esteem. More specifically, a stronger motivation to maintain and increase 
the positivity of the self-image should led people high in self-esteem to construct more 
detailed memories for positive self-relevant events. Some previous autobiographical memory 
studies have shown that self-esteem influences memory for previous emotional reactions, with 
high self-esteem individuals recalling their reactions in a more positive way (Christensen, 
Wood, & Feldman Barrett, 2003; Sutin & Robins, 2005). A recent study has further revealed 
that high self-esteem individuals rate personally meaningful (self-defining) memories as more 
vivid, coherent, accessible, and positively valenced (Sutin & Robins, 2007). However, the 
extent to which the influence of self-esteem is limited to memories for self-relevant events has 
not been investigated. In the current study, we examined this issue by comparing individuals 
high and low in self-esteem. We expected that high self-esteem individuals would present a 
stronger positivity bias for events that involve evaluations of the self but not for events that 




A total of 64 women and 48 men aged between 18 and 55 years volunteered to 
participate in the study. From these, two groups of participants were selected on the basis of 
their scores on the Rosenberg self-esteem scale (RSE), a widely used 10-item measure of self-
esteem (Rosenberg, 1965; French adaptation by Chambon et al., 1992). Participants who 
scored in the top quartile (score ≥ 34; M = 36.1, SD = 2.0) were defined as high self-esteem 
(HSE) individuals (11 women and 17 men aged between 20 and 54 years; M = 30 years, SD = 
12), whereas participants who scored in the bottom quartile (score ≤ 27; M = 24.2, SD = 3.3) 
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were defined as low self-esteem (LSE) individuals (20 women and 9 men aged between 18 
and 55 years; M = 26 years, SD = 10).  
 
Materials and procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a quiet environment. Detailed instructions 
explained that they would be asked to remember some events they had personally experienced 
in the past. The instructions specified that the events participants were to recall had to be 
precise and specific (i.e., they had to take place in a specific place at a specific time and they 
had to last a few minutes or hours but not more than a day); some examples were provided to 
illustrate what would or would not be considered as a specific event. Participants were asked 
to remember four events that varied according to valence (positive vs. negative) and target 
(self vs. other) of emotional evaluations: an event in which they felt proud of themselves, an 
event in which they felt ashamed of themselves, an event in which they felt admiration 
towards someone, and an event in which they felt contempt towards someone. For each event, 
participants were asked to try to remember the event in as much detail as possible (i.e., 
remembering the setting and course of the events, the persons and objects that were present) 
in order to mentally “re-experience” it. Immediately after having remembered each event, 
participants wrote a brief description of the event and rated their subjective experience with 7-
point rating scales. Memories were assessed for feeling of re-experiencing, visual details, 
other sensory details, location, time, coherence, verbal component, emotion while 
remembering, belief that the event is real, emotional valence, personal importance, and 
reactivation, using rating scales adapted from the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire 
(Johnson et al., 1988) and the Autobiographical Memory Questionnaire (Rubin et al., 2003). 
We added three items to asses memory for self-referential information (i.e., what one did, 
what one said, and what one thought during the event), and participants also assessed the 
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visual perspective they adopted while remembering (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). Finally, the age 
of each event was also recorded (in months). The rating scales that were used in this study are 
shown in Table 1. The order of presentation of the four types of events was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
Results 
Mean ratings for each phenomenological characteristic are shown in Table 2, as a 
function of self-esteem (HSE vs. LSE), valence (positive vs. negative), and target (self vs. 
other). Initial analyses did not reveal any effect of gender or interaction involving gender, so 
data from women and men are combined in the reported analyses. For each characteristic, the 
ratings were submitted to a 2 (self-esteem) X 2 (target) X 2 (valence) analysis of variance 
(ANOVA). As predicted, the ANOVA yielded a significant valence by target interaction for 
several phenomenological characteristics, showing that the effect of valence was modulated 
by evaluation target. This was the case for feeling of re-experiencing, F(1, 55) = 5.53, MSE = 
2.36, p = .02, other sensory details, F(1, 55) = 4.48, MSE = 2.14, p = .04, coherence, F(1, 55) 
= 21.69, MSE = 1.60, p < .001, verbal component, F(1, 55) = 4.72, MSE = 2.09, p = .03, belief 
that the event is real, F(1, 55) = 5.15, MSE = 0.57, p = .03, memory for what one did, F(1, 55) 
= 8.33, MSE = 1.78, p = .01, importance, F(1, 55) = 13.06, MSE = 2.84, p < .001, and 
reactivation, F(1, 55) = 9.05, MSE = 2.75, p = .003. The means were also in the predicted 
direction for memory for location and memory for what one said, but the valence by target 
interaction failed to reach statistical significance, F(1, 55) = 3.58, MSE = 1.29, p = .06, and 
F(1, 55) = 3.24, MSE = 3.16, p = .077, respectively. Follow-up comparisons showed that 
positive self-relevant events received higher ratings than negative self-relevant events for 
feeling of re-experiencing [t(56) = 2.95, p = .005, d = .40], other sensory details [t(56) = 2.43, 
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p = .02, d = .32], coherence [t(56) = 3.05, p = .004, d = .41], belief that the event is real [t(56) 
= 3.41, p = .001, d = .46], memory for what one did [t(56) = 2.15, p = .04, d = .29], 
importance [t(56) = 6.36, p < .001, d = .85], and reactivation [t(56) = 3.01, p = .004, d = .40], 
whereas there was no difference between positive and negative events that targeted another 
person [all t(56)s < 1, ps > .33, ds < .14] or the difference was reversed [for coherence, t(56) = 
2.76, p < .05, d = .37, and for what one did, t(56) = 1.89, p = .06, d = .25]. For verbal 
components, there was no difference between positive and negative events that targeted the 
self, t(56) = 1.01, p = .32, d = .13; negative events tended to receive higher ratings than 
positive events when they targeted another person, t(56) = 1.88, p = .06, d = .25.  
For other phenomenological characteristics, the ANOVA yielded a three-way 
interaction, indicating that the effect of valence was modulated by both self-esteem and the 
target of events. This was the case for visual details, F(1, 55) = 4.35, MSE = 2.08, p = .04, 
time, F(1, 55) = 4.52, MSE = 2.64, p = .04, feeling of emotions, F(1, 55) = 4.51, MSE = 2.75, 
p = .04, and memory for what one thought, F(1, 55) = 4.93, MSE = 1.63, p = .03. To further 
investigate these three-way interactions, 2 (valence) X 2 (target) ANOVAs were conducted 
separately for HSE and LSE individuals. For each characteristic, there was a significant 
valence by target interaction for HSE individual [all F(1, 27)s > 4.66, ps < .05], but not for 
LSE individuals [all F(1, 28)s < 1.44, ps > .24]. Follow-up comparisons showed that HSE 
individuals rated memories for positive events targeting the self as containing more visual 
details [t(27) = 4.27, p < .001, d = .82], clearer information about time [t(27) = 3.20, p = .004, 
d = .62], more emotional feelings during remembering [t(27) = 2.63, p = .01, d = .51], and 
clearer memory for thoughts [t(27) = 2.28, p = .03, d = .44] than memories for negative events 
targeting the self; by contrast, there was no valence effect for events that targeted another 
person [for visual details and time, t(27)s < 1, ps > .63, ds < .10] or the effect was reversed 
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[for feeling emotions, t(27) = 2.96, p = .006, d = .57, and thoughts, t(27) = 2.31, p = .03, d = 
.44].  
(Table 2 about here) 
Finally, visual perspective showed a main effect of target, F(1, 55) = 4.97, MSE = 
3.39, p = .03, with events targeting the self being remembered more with an observer 
perspective than events targeting another person; there was no other main effect or interaction 
[all F(1, 55)s < 1.59, ps > .20]. Ratings of valence showed a main effect of self-esteem, F(1, 
55) = 5.48, MSE = 1.59, p = .02 (ratings were higher in HSE individuals), a main effect of 
target, F(1, 55) = 26.64, MSE = 2.35, p < .001 (ratings were higher for events targeting the 
self), and a main effect of valence, F(1, 55) = 453.94, MSE = 1.07, p < .001 (ratings were 
higher for positive events), but no interaction between these factors [all F(1, 55)s < 1.14, ps > 
.29]. There was no significant main effect or interaction with regard to event age [all F(1, 55)s 
< 3.27, ps > .07]. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine whether the phenomenological experience 
associated with remembering positive and negative events is modulated by the relevance of 
events to the self-image. Participants were asked to recall positive and negative events that 
involved self-evaluations (i.e., pride and shame) and positive and negative events that 
involved evaluations about someone else (i.e., admiration and contempt); the 
phenomenological experience associated with remembering each type of event was assessed 
using a series of rating scales. We expected to observe a positivity bias consisting of 
subjectively remembering positive events with more details than negative events, but only for 
events that entail self-evaluations. In agreement with this prediction, we found that the 
valence and target of events interacted to influence memory characteristics. More specifically, 
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memories for pride episodes were associated with increased feelings of re-experiencing and a 
stronger belief that the event was real, contained more sensory details such as sounds, smells 
and tastes and more details about what one did, were considered as more important, and had 
been reactivated more frequently than memories for shame episodes; these differences 
between positive and negative memories did not occur (or were even reversed) for events 
targeting another person (i.e., episodes involving admiration vs. contempt). For other 
phenomenological characteristics, biases in remembering self-evaluative events were 
modulated by participants’ level of self-esteem, such that memories for pride episodes 
contained more visual details, clearer information about time, more details about what one 
thought, and were associated with more emotional feelings during remembering (relative to 
memories for shame episodes), but only for participants high in self-esteem. These latter 
findings are consistent with and extend previous studies (Christensen et al., 2003; Sutin & 
Robins, 2005, 2007), providing evidence that the influence of self-esteem is specific to 
memories for self-relevant events. Importantly, the reported effects cannot be simply 
explained in terms of differences in event age, as there was no significant main effect or 
interaction concerning this dimension. 
Overall, the current findings support our claim that the self-enhancement motive 
shapes the phenomenological experience associated with remembering positive versus 
negative events. First, the effect of valence was clearly modulated by the target of emotional 
evaluations, such that a positivity bias was only apparent for events involving self-
evaluations. Second, this bias was more pronounced (i.e., affected more memory 
characteristics) for people who succeed in creating and maintaining a positive view of the self 
(i.e., people high in self-esteem). As already mentioned, the functioning of autobiographical 
memory is influenced by motives to maintain or promote certain kinds of self-images and, 
reciprocally, self-images are grounded in memories for personal experiences (Conway, 2005; 
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Conway et al., 2004). The phenomenological qualities of memories undoubtedly play an 
important role in this process, determining the power of the memories in shaping self-images. 
Remembering self-flattering episodes in a more detailed way, having a higher feeling of 
mentally re-experiencing them and a stronger belief that they were real thus provide valuable 
resources to ground positive self-views in past experiences. These biases in the 
phenomenology of memories for self-relevant episodes are probably an important part of the 
arsenal of psychological mechanisms people use to increase or maintain a positive self-image 
(along with biases in attention, judgment, and attribution; Baumeister, 1998; Leary, 2007; 
Sedikides & Gregg, 2003).  
Having demonstrated the existence of a positivity bias in the subjective experience 
associated with remembering self-relevant episodes, we now discuss the mechanisms that 
might underlie this bias. It is likely that the influence of self-enhancement operates at multiple 
stages of memory processing. First, self-enhancement motives might affect attention and 
elaborative processing during memory encoding. There is indeed evidence that people engage 
less processing resources when encoding negative compared to positive self-relevant 
information (Sedikides & Green, 2000). People may also control the retrieval of stored 
information, favoring access to positive rather than negative self-relevant information 
(D'Argembeau et al., 2005). In particular, Conway (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-
Pearce, 2000) proposed that the self modulates the accessibility of knowledge in 
autobiographical memory in order to increase access to information that is consistent with 
goals and self-knowledge and to decrease access to information that challenges self-
knowledge and might thus be destabilizing. Such control processes might shape the 
phenomenology of memories throughout the retrieval process to favor the construction of 
detailed representations of pride rather than shame episodes. The influence of individual 
differences in self-esteem might also be explained, at least in part, in terms of control 
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processes that modulate the accessibility of autobiographical knowledge. Indeed, Sutin and 
Robins (2007) recently reported that individuals with high self-esteem rate their self-defining 
memories as more accessible and more positively valenced. Finally, we found that memories 
for pride episodes had been reactivated (through thinking and/or social sharing) more 
frequently than memories for shame episodes. Reactivation of memories strengthens 
associations between the memory constituents (e.g., objects, people, actions, and feelings; 
Johnson & Chalfonte, 1994), and helps maintain the episode in memory for longer periods of 
time by linking it to conceptual knowledge regarding long-term goals and self-images 
(Conway, 2001, 2005). Conversely, research shows that repeated attempts to avoid the 
retrieval of a memory decrease its subsequent accessibility (Anderson & Green, 2001), and 
functional neuroimaging suggests that these processes recruit the lateral prefrontal cortex to 
disengage hippocampal processing that supports recollection (Anderson et al., 2004). This 
type of inhibitory mechanisms may be recruited in everyday life to prevent unwanted 
memories from entering consciousness (Anderson, 2006). Differences in the frequency of 
reactivations of positive versus negative self-relevant memories may thus have modulated the 
current accessibility of these memories and, consequently, the phenomenological experience 
associated with retrieval. These propositions remain speculative, however, and further studies 
need to be conducted in order to uncover the precise cognitive and neural mechanisms that 
underlie self-enhancement biases in the phenomenology of autobiographical memories and, in 
particular, to determine the respective contribution of facilitative versus inhibitory processes. 
Contrary to most other phenomenological characteristics, the visual perspective of the 
memories did not show any trace of self-enhancing influences. Considering that observer 
memories can serve a distancing function (Libby & Eibach, 2002), one could expect that 
people would report more observer memories for negative events targeting the self. We found 
that events targeting the self were remembered more with an observer perspective than events 
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targeting another person, which is consistent with previous findings that situations associated 
with higher levels of self-awareness are more likely to be recalled with an observer 
perspective (Nigro & Neisser, 1983). However, this effect was not modulated by event 
valence (see also D’Argembeau et al., 2003; D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004). Thus, 
there was no evidence for a distancing function of the observer perspective in this study.  
Finally, it should be noted that, although participants displayed a general tendency to 
remember pride episodes with more details than shame episodes, memories for shame 
episodes did not completely lack details (as can be seen in Table 2, mean ratings for most 
phenomenological characteristics still fell above the midpoint of the rating scales). Self-
enhancement is associated with psychological gains (e.g., subjective well-being, persistence 
in the pursuit of one’s goals, better coping with adverse situations; Taylor & Brown, 1988) 
but it can also lead to intrapersonal and interpersonal costs (e.g., excessive risk taking, being 
perceived negatively and treated unpleasantly by others; Leary, 2004). It is therefore 
important to have a sufficiently balanced view of the self that is not too much disconnected 
from reality (Leary, 2004; Sedikides, Gregg, & Hart, 2007). Subtle differences in the way 
people subjectively remember positive and negative self-relevant experiences might help 
maintain a positive view of the self, while at the same time keeping a sufficiently balanced 
view of the self. In addition, it is likely that the ability to access negative information about 
oneself varies according to circumstances. In particular, when dealing with a difficult 
situation in the present or when envisioning how to face such a situation in the future, it is 
sometimes advantageous to acknowledge one’s own shortcomings and remember past failures 
in similar events in order to better handle the present or future circumstances. In other words, 
memories of past failures warn us of problems that have been encountered in the past (e.g., 
unwanted consequences of a particular behavior) and motivate us to make decisions and take 
action to avoid repeating similar problems in the future (D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 
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2007). Thus, most people may display a general tendency to inhibit access to information that 
might tarnish the self-image, yet negative self-referent information might still be accessed to 
form a balanced view of the self and to adjust to situations where accurate estimations of 
one’s own shortcomings and knowledge about past failures help make advantageous 
decisions. 
In conclusion, the current study comforts the view that autobiographical memory is 
motivated (Conway, 2005) and suggests, in particular, that self-enhancement motives play an 
important role in shaping the phenomenology of autobiographical memories. Subjectively 
remembering pride episodes with more details than shame episodes, having a higher feeling 
of mentally re-experiencing and a stronger belief that the events were real probably play an 
important role in creating and maintaining a positive view of the self. Future studies should be 
conducted to uncover the precise cognitive and neural processes that underlie this 
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Rating scales used to assess the phenomenological characteristics associated with remembering 
Characteristic Brief description of rating scale 
Feeling of re-experiencing While remembering the event, I feel as though I am mentally reliving it: 1 = not at all, 7 = completely. 
Visual details My memory for this event involves visual details: 1 = none, 7 = a lot. 
Other sensory details My memory for this event involves other sensory details (sounds, smells, and/or tastes): 1 = none, 7 = a lot. 
Location I remember the location where the event took place: 1 = not at all clear, 7 = very clearly. 
Time I remember the time of day when the event took place: 1 = not at all clear, 7 = very clear. 
Coherence While remembering the event, it comes to me as a coherent story and not as an isolated scene: 1 = not at all, 
7 = completely. 
Verbal component While remembering the event, it comes to me in words: 1 = not at all, 7 = a lot. 
Feeling emotions While remembering the event, I feel the emotions I felt when the event occurred: 1 = not at all, 7 = 
completely. 
Real/imagine I believe the event in my memory really occurred in the way I remember it and that I have not imagined or 
fabricated anything that did not occur: 1 = 100% imaginary, 7 = 100% real. 
What I did I remember what I did during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly. 
What I said I remember what I said during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly. 
What I thought I remember what I thought during this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very clearly. 
Visual perspective A detailed paragraph adapted from Nigro and Neisser (1983) asked participants to report whether they 
“saw” themselves in their memory (observer perspective) or saw the scene from their own perspective 
(field perspective): from –3 = entirely looking through my eyes to +3 = entirely observing myself from an 
outside point of view. 
Valence When the event happened, my emotions were: –3 = very negative, 0 = neutral, +3 = very positive. 
Personal importance This event is important to me (it involves an important theme or episode in my life): 1 = not at all 
important, 7 = very important. 
Reactivation Since it occurred, I have thought or talked about this event: 1 = not at all, 7 = very often. 
Event age How long ago did this event occur? (in months) 
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Table 2 
Means and standard deviations of ratings for phenomenological characteristics 
 HSE individuals  LSE individuals 
 Self Other  Self Other 
 Positive Negative Positive Negative  Positive Negative Positive Negative 
Feeling of re-
experiencing1 
5.39 (1.17) 4.00 (1.63) 4.68 (1.76) 4.71 (1.88)  5.44 (1.55) 5.14 (1.57) 4.79 (1.32) 4.97 (1.72) 
Visual details2 5.89 (1.10) 4.54 (1.32) 5.54 (1.55) 5.36 (1.59)  5.00 (1.73) 4.86 (1.57) 5.34 (1.26) 4.79 (1.70) 
Other sensory details1 4.89 (1.55) 3.21 (1.77) 4.14 (1.74) 4.00 (2.11)  3.66 (1.88) 3.52 (2.21) 3.83 (1.49) 3.79 (1.72) 
Location3 6.75 (0.59) 5.82 (1.51) 6.39 (0.99) 6.50 (1.32)  6.31 (1.17) 6.38 (1.04) 6.17 (1.44) 6.34 (1.20) 
Time2 6.25 (0.89) 5.32 (1.47) 5.68 (1.74) 5.82 (1.66)  5.51 (1.70) 5.48 (2.01) 5.79 (1.66) 5.00 (2.17) 
Coherence1 5.43 (1.67) 4.46 (1.48) 4.71 (1.74) 5.25 (1.60)  4.93 (1.73) 4.17 (1.91) 4.21 (1.99) 5.07 (1.81) 
Verbal component1 4.54 (1.79) 4.07 (1.96) 3.79 (1.95) 4.61 (1.64)  3.79 (2.02) 3.66 (1.88) 3.83 (1.54) 4.07 (1.91) 
Feeling of emotions2 5.79 (1.17) 4.71 (1.82) 4.82 (1.66) 5.82 (1.25)  5.10 (1.54) 5.41 (1.35) 4.79 (1.84) 5.31 (1.77) 
Real/imagine1 6.75 (0.59) 6.07 (1.09) 6.57 (0.63) 6.29 (1.05)  6.21 (0.98) 5.69 (1.34) 5.86 (1.19) 5.86 (1.22) 
What I did1 5.39 (1.57) 4.89 (1.47) 4.71 (1.63) 5.39 (1.34)  5.17 (1.47) 4.59 (1.86) 4.41 (1.05) 4.69 (1.65) 
What I said3 4.71 (1.88) 4.07 (2.07) 4.25 (1.78) 4.79 (2.04)  4.28 (1.91) 4.00 (1.89) 4.07 (1.33) 4.31 (1.87) 
What I thought2 5.61 (1.40) 4.68 (1.70) 5.32 (1.51) 5.96 (1.17)  5.28 (1.39) 5.17 (1.61) 5.38 (1.63) 5.34 (1.04) 
Visual perspective -0.43 (2.47) 0.07 (2.14) -0.89 (2.33) -0.57 (2.17)  0.07 (2.28) 0.24 (2.15) -0.52 (2.29) -0.24 (2.20) 
Valence 2.82 (0.61) -1.21 (1.57) 1.93 (1.44) -2.21 (1.66)  2.59 (0.68) -2.24 (1.09) 1.86 (1.46) -2.45 (1.02) 
Importance1 5.71 (1.38) 3.46 (1.71) 4.54 (1.73) 3.93 (2.24)  5.48 (1.30) 4.03 (1.94) 3.86 (1.46) 4.00 (2.00) 
Reactivation1 4.25 (1.82) 2.89 (1.37) 3.50 (1.75) 3.82 (1.49)  4.00 (1.83) 3.34 (1.97) 3.41 (1.62) 3.72 (1.91) 
Event age (months) 52 (102) 77 (93) 70 (104) 50 (102)  54 (86) 77 (87) 40 (78) 43 (47) 
Note: HSE: high self-esteem; LSE: low self-esteem. 
1 Characteristic for which there was a significant interaction between valence and target (p < .05). 
2 Characteristic for which there was a significant interaction between self-esteem, valence and target (p < .05). 
3 Characteristic for which the valence by target interaction approached significance (p < .10). 
 
